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CONTRACTS – PREEMPTION OF INDEMNIFICATION  
 
Summary 
 
 On petition for writ of mandamus challenging a denial of summary judgment, the Court 
considered whether the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) preempts state law claims for 
indemnification brought by an admitted violator of the ADA. 
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 
 The ADA preempts indemnification claims brought by owners for their violations thereof 
because such claims would pose an obstacle to the ADA. 
 
Facts and Procedural History 
 
 In 2002, Mandalay Corporation entered into a contract with petitioner Rolf Jensen & 
Associates for consulting services regarding construction of an expansion to the Mandalay Bay 
Resort and Casino (the Resort) in compliance with the ADA.  The parties’ contract contained a 
provision that Rolf Jensen would indemnify Mandalay for any damages arising from an act, 
omission, or willful misconduct by Rolf Jensen in performance of its obligations.   
  
 After the Resort expansion was constructed, the Department of Justice (DOJ) began an 
investigation of numerous violations of the ADA arising from a lack of handicap accessibility at 
the Resort. Thereafter, Mandalay entered into a comprehensive settlement agreement with the 
DOJ that required Mandalay to bring the Resort into compliance with the ADA. The retrofits 
were estimated to cost Mandalay more than $20 million. 
 
 Mandalay sued Rolf Jensen in district court seeking to recover the costs of the retrofit. 
Following preliminary motion practice, claims remained for (1) express indemnification, (2) 
breach of contract, (3) breach of express warranty, and (4) negligent misrepresentation.  Rolf 
Jensen filed for summary judgment asserting that each claim was preempted by the ADA. The 
district court denied Rolf Jensen’s motion for summary judgment.  Rolf Jensen petitioned the 
Supreme Court of Nevada for a writ of mandamus directing the district court to grant its motion.  
 
Discussion 
 
 Justice Saitta wrote the opinion for the unanimous Court.
2
 In entertaining the petition, the 
Court noted that the issue of preemption under the ADA was an issue of nationwide magnitude 
in need of clarification in the courts of Nevada. 
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2 Justice Pickering voluntarily recused herself from participation in this decision. 
A. Preemption 
 
 The Court reviewed the question of preemption de novo, noting that under the Supremacy 
Clause of the United States Constitution state law must yield when it frustrates or conflicts with 
federal law.
3
  This petition involved conflict preemption, concerning whether, in view of the 
ADA’s purpose and intended effects, Mandalay’s state law claims posed an obstacle to the 
accomplishment of Congress’s objectives in enacting the ADA.  
 
 As a threshold matter, the Court noted the “two cornerstones” of preemption: first, that 
“the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption case.”4 Second, a 
presumption against preemption arose out of respect for state sovereignty when Congress 
legislates in fields traditionally occupied by the states.  This petition concerned Congress’s 
legislation in the area of disability discrimination, a legislative landscape not traditionally 
occupied by the states, so the Court found the presumption against preemption did not apply with 
particular force in this matter.  
 
B. The ADA 
 
 Reviewing the purposed and intended effects of the ADA, the Court found the goal of the 
ADA to be twofold: to not only remedy discrimination against disabled individuals but to 
prevent it. The ADA had a comprehensive scope covering discriminatory practices disabled 
people faced including access to public accommodations.
5
 Congress also designed the ADA to 
prevent discrimination stemming from neglect and indifference as well as intentional 
discrimination. So when, as in this case, a facility was not constructed to be readily accessible to 
individuals with disabilities, the owner was liable for unlawful discrimination regardless of 
intent.
6
  The Court noted that there were no provisions permitting indemnification or allocations 
of liability between various entities subject to the ADA, except for in landlord-tenant 
relationships.
7
  
 
C. Mandalay’s Indemnification Claim 
 
 Rolf Jensen argued that indemnification claims such as Mandalay’s were preempted 
because they diminished owners’ incentive to comply with the ADA thereby frustrating 
Congress’s goal of preventing disability discrimination.  Mandalay argued that its 
indemnification claim actually advanced the purpose of the ADA because with indemnification,  
owners would be more likely to use consultants such as Rolf Jensen which would promote ADA 
compliance. Mandalay also argued it was unfair to bear the cost of the retrofit when Rolf Jensen 
was a direct factor causing the expenses and that indemnification did not deprive disabled 
persons the right to seek relief for violations of the ADA. 
 
                                                        
3 Nanopierce Tech. V. Depository Trust, 123 Nev. 362, 370, 168 P.3d 73, 79 (2007). 
4 Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009)(quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 521 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)).  
5 PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 675 (2001). 
6 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182(a); 12183(a)(1) (2006).  
7 28 C.F.R. § 36.201(b) (2010). 
 The Court agreed with other courts that “flatly rejected” the type of indemnification 
claim brought by Mandalay.  In the leading case, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that permitting an 
owner to, in essence, circumvent responsibility for its violations of the ADA and Fair Housing 
Act through an indemnification claim would lessen the owner’s incentive to ensure compliance, 
so such claims were preempted.
8
  Likewise, federal district courts had uniformly concluded that 
owners’ indemnification claims for their own ADA violations undermine the goals of the ADA. 
The Court concluded that such claims would allow owners to contractually maneuver themselves 
into a position where, in essence, they could ignore their nondelegable responsibilities under the 
ADA. Thus, the Court held that the ADA preempts indemnification claims brought by owners 
for their violations because such claims would pose an obstacle to the ADA. 
 
 The Court disagreed with Mandalay’s assertion that permitting indemnification claims 
would promote ADA compliance. Owners sought advice to aid in their duty to comply with the 
ADA: an indemnification mindset would have a debilitating effect on ADA compliance, as 
illustrated by the numerous ADA violations in this case. The surest way to ensure compliance 
would be to hold owners’ risks of noncompliance firmly in place.  
 
The Court also disagreed with Mandalay’s contention that preemption was unfair, noting 
that a highly sophisticated entity with ultimate authority over all construction decisions, such as 
Mandalay, was in the best position to prevent violations.  Rolf Jensen was not immunized from 
liability for any role in the Mandalay violations, because its liability would run to disabled 
individuals rather than to Mandalay. Further, the Court found that although indemnification did 
not directly interfere with the rights of disabled individuals to obtain relief under the ADA, the 
goal of the ADA was preventative as well as remedial, and Mandalay’s indemnification claim 
would thwart the prophylactic aspects of the ADA.  
 
Finally, the Court found unavailing the authorities that Mandalay “patched together” to 
seek allocation of responsibility for complying with the ADA, such as the landlord tenant 
exception, and the suggestion that the ADA created tort liability, which traditionally allowed 
indemnification. 
 
 Mandalay’s remaining claims for breach of contract, breach of express warranty, and 
negligent misrepresentation were also preempted by the ADA, because these claims were in 
substance merely a reiteration of Mandalay’s claim for indemnification.   
 
Conclusion 
 
The Court granted Rolf Jensen’s petition for extraordinary relief and issued a writ of 
mandamus to direct the district court to grant Rolf Jensen’s motion for summary judgment. The 
Court concluded that Mandalay’s state law claims for indemnification posed an obstacle to the 
objectives of the ADA and therefore were preempted. 
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